

**Statement by the National Election Integrity Association (NEIA)
International Election Monitoring Team (IEMT)**

June 5, 2025

The International Election Monitoring Team (IEMT) of the National Election Integrity Association (NEIA) conducted its observation mission independently over a ten-day period from May 26 to June 4, 2025, in connection with the Republic of Korea's early presidential election held on June 3, 2025. The IEMT operated without the cooperation or official authorization of the National Election Commission (NEC), and under such limited conditions, it nevertheless endeavored to monitor and assess the transparency and fairness of the election. Its activities included holding press conferences and public briefings, visiting early voting stations in Seoul, attending youth-led rallies and film screenings focused on election integrity, listening to citizen-led monitoring reports, and analyzing both domestic and international media coverage.

The team shared its observations and findings with the international community through multiple channels, including social media platforms such as X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook, as well as interviews with Korean and U.S. media outlets, independent journalists, and major international news platforms such as The Epoch Times, The Washington Times, NTD News, Steve Bannon's War Room, and Newsmax.

During this election, the IEMT again observed extreme disparities in voting trends between early voting and same-day voting. This pattern, which had already raised questions during the 2020, 2022 and 2024 national elections, was once again evident. At the time, it was commonly argued that "young people vote early" (and tend to be progressive), while "older people vote on election day" (and lean conservative). However, official government statistics from 2020 indicated that the majority of early voters were in fact older citizens—undermining the narrative and exposing a contradiction that has yet to be resolved. The recurrence of such voting disparities in 2025 raises renewed concerns about statistical anomalies and potential manipulation.

The IEMT also noted that many young people were actively participating in election monitoring and civic efforts to safeguard fairness. This challenges simplistic assumptions about voting behavior based on age and political orientation, and suggests that youth involvement in pro-democracy movements is broader than often portrayed.

Throughout its activities, the IEMT repeatedly identified structural and technical deficiencies and on-site irregularities that called into question the integrity of the election process. These findings were previously documented in three official statements. With the completion of the June 3 election, the IEMT now presents this final statement to summarize its key concerns regarding the vote counting results.

1. Extreme Disparity Between Early Voting and Election Day Voting Results

- The overall voter turnout for this election was 79.4%, with early voting accounting for 34.74% and election day voting for 44.66%, making election day turnout 9.92% higher.
- Candidate #1 (Lee Jae-myung) received 37.96% of the election day vote but 63.72% in early voting. Candidate #2 (Kim Moon-soo) earned 53.00% on election day but only 26.44% in early voting. Their total vote shares were 49.42% and 41.15%, respectively. In short, although Candidate #2 won the more heavily weighted election day vote by over 15 percentage points, he lost the early vote by more than 37 points, resulting in an overall defeat by 8.27 percentage points.
- A disparity of up to 27.28 percentage points between two voting periods conducted only days apart among the same voter population is a statistical anomaly rarely seen in democratic elections.
- The stability of minor candidate results further underscores the irregularity. The third-place candidate earned 8.83% in early voting, 7.94% on election day, and 8.34% overall. Another minor candidate, Candidate #4, received 0.96% in early voting and 0.99% on election day, with an overall share of 0.98%. These figures remained within a 1% margin across both voting periods.
- In contrast, the results between the top two candidates reversed dramatically within a few days, suggesting the possibility of abnormal interference in early vote tabulation or counting procedures. An immediate and thorough technical audit of the early voting system and counting process is urgently warranted.

2. Exit Poll Reliability and Reporting Practices Must Be Improved

- South Korea's three main terrestrial broadcasters released exit poll results at 8:00 p.m. on election day, projecting 51.7% for Lee Jae-myung, 39.3% for Kim Moon-soo, and 7.7% for Lee Jun-seok. However, the official overall results showed 49.42%, 41.15%, and 8.34%, respectively. Election day-only results showed 37.96%, 53.00%, and 7.94%.
- Thus, the exit polls overstated support for Candidate #1 and understated support for Candidate #2, with even greater discrepancies when compared to election day votes alone.
- These exit polls were released just before vote counting began, heavily influencing public perception and potentially voter behavior. Their accuracy must therefore be rigorously ensured and subject to public verification.
- Exit polls, by law, do not include early voters and are based solely on election day responses. Yet broadcasters appear to have incorporated early voting estimates by undisclosed methods, presenting blended projections as singular figures. This approach creates confusion and undermines confidence in the poll's accuracy.

- Therefore, exit poll results should be published separately for early and election day voting. Their accuracy should be assessed against the actual election day vote tallies.
- Broadcasters and the National Election Commission (NEC) must disclose the methodologies, respondent samples, statistical processing steps, and whether early voting was estimated through phone interviews. Transparent disclosure is essential to restoring public trust and electoral fairness.

3. Citizen Reports and Evidence Require Serious Verification

- The IEMT received videos, photographs, and field reports from numerous civic observers and watchdog groups. These materials cannot be dismissed as isolated or conspiratorial but instead represent consistent patterns nationwide.
- Notable allegations include inflated official turnout figures, tampering or obstruction of ballot seals, pristine unfolded ballots suggesting pre-stuffing, instances of suspected duplicate voting and false identification, and reports of CCTV being disabled or observers obstructed.
- If proven accurate, these issues indicate not mere administrative error but potential systemic flaws or organized interference in election procedures.
- To restore public confidence, the NEC must not dismiss these allegations as conspiracy theories but instead initiate immediate and independent investigations into all credible reports.

4. Citizen Election Monitoring Must Be Protected

- Many citizens expressed urgent concerns and requested support for election monitoring, indicating that formal reporting mechanisms may be inaccessible or untrustworthy.
- Citizen oversight that does not disrupt election operations is essential to transparency. Legal or institutional suppression of such monitoring is contrary to democratic values. On the contrary, it should be institutionally encouraged and protected as a core component of participatory democracy.

The IEMT reaffirms its deep respect for the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea and conducted this observation mission solely to evaluate election integrity in accordance with international norms—not to interfere in domestic affairs. Dismissing widespread concerns as mere conspiracy is not the response of a responsible democracy. Only through transparent explanations and meaningful institutional reforms can public trust be restored.

The IEMT will compile a full report based on all collected data, consistent with international standards, and submit it to the governments of Korea and the United States, the United Nations and other global electoral bodies, the U.S. Congress, and major international media outlets.

We remain committed to international cooperation to protect democratic elections and restore public faith in the electoral process in the Republic of Korea.

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International Election Monitoring Team (IEMT)
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